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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 This paper compares the legal and constitutional rights of students in the United States and 
Great Britain. Students will receive more exemptions for religious reasons in the United States as 
compared to Great Britain because it is generally easier for an individual to assert his or her 
fundamental freedoms under the United States Constitution.1  Although the British system 
recognizes equality and freedom, it discriminates against minority religions because their needs are 
not inherently accommodated.2  Furthermore, as long as there are practicable alternatives, British 
courts will not grant exemptions to students.3  However, most of the time, the alternatives do not 
entirely satisfy the student's needs.4 
[T]he predominant absence of religion from American  public schools, which is the 
result of the First Amendment's prohibition of establishment, tends to promote more 
religious freedom than the British system. In contrast to British education, which has 
legislatively and in practice endorsed  Christianity as the core faith, American  
education, which 
 
                                                          
1 Jaclyn Kass, Religious Accommodations in Education: A Comparison of Non-Establishment in the 
United States and Established Religion in England and Wales, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1505-1531 
(2008). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
supports no religious beliefs, effectively treats all religions equally from the beginning. 
As religious exceptions or accommodations are necessary, courts have the ability to grant 
them to protect the individual's right to free exercise. 5 
Although Great Britain still has an established church, the United States and Great Britain 
both encourage religious freedom. "The Bill of Rights automatically grants American citizens 
the right to free exercise of religion, and the courts then decide at what point that right should be 
curtailed for the sake of maintaining a civilized society. Conversely, British courts, which are not 
bound by a Bill of Rights, have the liberty to grant additional rights as they are requested. As in 
the United States, however, rights can be denied for the sake of maintaining order." 6 
The United States tends to be slightly more tolerant in the classroom because American 
culture focuses on the rights of the individual, whereas England's focus is the availability (or 
lack) of alternatives to the circumstances creating the problem.7 There are some similarities 
between the two countries' approaches to church-state issues. Both allow some governmental 
religious expression that has become part of the cultural fabric. In Great Britain, the long history 
of establishment and close relationship between the Church of England and the British State 
means that some of the most noticeable religious expressions are not generally perceived as 
implying a particular state stance towards religion or any coercion. In the United States, some 
government acknowledgments of religion are constitutionally acceptable. 8 
5 Jd. at. 1521 
6 Jd. 
7 Id at 1521-22. 
8 Judith D. Fischer, Chloe J. Wallace, God and Caesar in the Twenty-First Century: What Recent 
Cases Say About Church-State Relations in England and the United States, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 
485, 513 (2006). 
2 
Both countries allow churches a great deal of autonomy from state interference. In Great 
Britain, state authorities retain some jurisdiction over the established Church, but it is rarely 
exercised. Still, that jurisdiction has symbolic value because it clarifies that British establishment 
is not the same as clerical rule or the imposition of particular beliefs or behaviors. Establishment 
is seen as placing an obligation on the Church of England to operate in a way that reflects the 
multi-faith nature of British society. Thus, one could say that Great Britain has an established 
church but not an established religion. Meanwhile, in the United States, the reluctance of the 
courts to interfere with church matters is based on the Free Exercise Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment, which also forbids the imposition of particular beliefs. 9 
Although the United States and Britain diverge regarding religion's place in government 
and in education, the two countries are aligned in their desire to protect an individual's right to 
freedom of religion. This issue is frequently raised in a school setting because some students 
require special religious accommodations. 
Separation between Church and State: 
Great Britain's Background 
Unlike the situation in the United States, where the concept of establishment has been the 
subject of a significant body of jurisprudence and academic interpretation, in Great Britain (and 
more generally within Europe), "establishment" is not a legal term of art but a general 
description of a state of affairs. The historical core of British establishment is the fact that the 
Head of State (the reigning monarch) is also the head of the established Church. The significance 
3 
------
of this has diminished as the role of the monarch within the British constitution has diminished. 10 
In the seventeenth century, establishment meant that the nation and the Church of England were 
unified. Consequently, dissent was punished as disloyalty and sedition. While Protestant dissent 
came to be tolerated, Roman Catholic dissent was much more severely treated. Precisely 
because, it involved not only a lack of loyalty towards the English nation, but potentially 
sympathy and unity with other, Roman Catholic nations. In Elizabeth times, religious conformity 
was a way of maintaining national cohesion around the twin pillars of the Monarch and the 
Church. She was a subscriber to the view of the unity of Church and Monarch and therefore 
viewed nonconformity as sedition however, what she was interested in was a unity of practice 
and allegiance, rather than a unity of theology or personal belief. 11 
However, this understanding developed considerably since 1829, the date of Roman 
Catholic emancipation. The contemporary Church of England is not understood as constituting 
or united to the nation, but as a Church of baptized Christians with a particular duty of service to 
the nation. A central feature of establishment in Great Britain is that the Church of England is 
given by the state the symbolic function of making religion present within public life. This is 
partly visible in the context of civic religion: significant events in the life of the nation are often 
marked by church services organized by the Church of England, in the Anglican mold, but with 
the participation of other denominations and faiths. 12 Therefore, a further principle of 
10 See Michael Burgess, Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom: New Model or Mere 
Respray?, 40 S. TEx. L. REv. 715, 717 (1999). 
11 See Kenneth Hylson-Smith, The Churches in England from Elizabeth I to Elizabeth II 32 
(1996). 
12See David McClean, The Changing Legal Framework of Establishment, 7 Ecc. L.J. 292 
(2004). 
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establishment can be understood as an acknowledgement of the public role of religion and a 
resistance to its being seen only as part of the private life of an individual. 
While British establishment appears to require the state publicly to acknowledge the 
existence and value of religion, it claims it does not require the state to impose religious belief, 
or any particular religious belief, on its citizens. 13 Notably, the existence of civic events of a 
religious, even Christian, nature should not be interpreted as an attempt to force people into a 
particular religious belief. There is something of a tradition within the Church of England of 
distinguishing acts and beliefs, and of leaving the matter of the conscience up to the individual. 
Historically, much of the spirit of the contemporary Church of England and contemporary 
establishment can be traced back to the time of Queen Elizabeth I. 14 However the claim that 
Great Britain's establishment does not distinguish or impose a particular religion is problematic 
in the realm of individual religious rights, as it pertains to educational accommodations. 
Education in Great Britain 
The 1559 Act of Uniformity established the Church of England as the national religion. 15 
Despite the Anglican establishment, Great Britain has worked vigorously to protect religious 
freedom for all religions. While the Church of England may appear to be the preferred religion, 
today Great Britain tolerates all minority faiths and guarantees them freedom of worship and the 
freedom to practice their religion in public. 16 Additionally, the functions of the Church do not 
13 Fischer, supra note 8, at 491. 
14 !d. 
15 Act ofUniformity, 1559, (Eng.). 
16 Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The Establishment Clause 
in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MAR.Q. L. REv. 867, 917 (2005). 
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coincide with the functions of public government. The House of Lords recently held that, under 
the Human Rights Act of 1998, the Church of England is not a "public authority." 17 
Great Britain does not have a written constitution or a bill of rights like the United States, 
but the common law and statutes tend to protect civil liberties. (In Britain long-standing 
traditions become the law, hence no Constitutional Bill of Rights.) Additionally, Britain adheres 
to the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 ("Convention"). 18 The European Council, 
which was formed after the conclusion of World War II, enacted the Convention to protect 
various fundamental freedoms and rights. 19 Article 9 of the Convention states: 
( 1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of others. 20 
Another relevant provision of the Convention is Article 2 of Protocol 1, which states: 
"No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it 
assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to 
ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religions and philosophical 
17 Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?. 49 MCGILL 
L.J. 635, 639 (2004). 
18 Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights§ 1, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950. 
19 Christina Kitterman, Comment, The United Kingdom's Human Rights Act of 1998: Will the 
Parliament Relinquish Its Sovereignty to Ensure Human Rights Protection in Domestic Courts?, 
7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 584, 585 (2001). 
20 European Convention, supra note 18. 
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convictions."21 Religious schools in Great Britain are found in both the private sector and a 
predominant part of the public sector. Great Britain funds both types of schools, in contrast to 
American schools, which are governed by state and local rules. Educational standards in Great 
Britain are governed by Parliamentary legislation. 
Modem education law in Great Britain was developed through various legislative acts 
beginning with the Education Act 1944.22 The 1944 Act created a new system of education in 
post-war England. 23 An often litigated provision of the 1944 Act requires a local education 
authority (LEA) to provide students with transportation to and from school. This provision raised 
many issue because the 1944 Act also allowed parents the right to choose which school their 
children would attend, and sometimes a desired school was located far away. 
Under the 1944 Act, an LEA "was obliged to have regard to parental preference," but the 
Education Act 1980 made it a mandatory requirement for an LEA to comply with a parent's 
request.24 The Education Reform Act 1988 further advanced parental rights and preferences by 
giving them greater choices regarding where their children would attend school, influence over 
the governing bodies, and control of certain types of schools.25 A parent would usually choose 
one school over another for religious reasons. The Education Act 1996 repealed the earlier Acts 
21 Council of Europe, Protocol! to the European Convention on Human Rights, art. 2, Mar. 20, 
1952. 
22 Education Act, 1944, (Eng.). 
23 See VERA G. MCEWAN, EDUCATION LAW 3-5 (2d ed. 1999). 
24 ld. at 5. 
25 !d. 
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to consolidate all of the modem law, and the Education Act 1998 established the current 
structure of schools. 26 
There are five main types of schools in England, voluntary, maintained, community, 
foundation, and independent schools. The LEA's own community and maintained schools, 
voluntary schools, which are only assisted rather than owned by LEAs, receive various amounts 
of government funding and usually serve a particular religious persuasion?7 Voluntary schools 
are often started by parties who believe that the government's educational provisions are 
inconsistent with their own religious beliefs but who cannot afford to finance a private school 
independently.28 It has been argued that the system inherently discriminates, as Muslim 
applications have consistently been turned down on procedural or technical grounds?9 
Independent schools are the equivalent of American private schools. Independent schools 
maintain private contracts with students and are therefore not subject to judicial review.30 A 
significant number of independent schools serve religious traditions that have only recently 
arrived in England, such as Judaism (1650's) and Islam (191h and 20th century). Criticism of the 
teachers and curricula at independent schools has made it difficult for religious groups to set up 
such schools in their communities?1 
26 ld. at 67. 
27 ld. at 19. 
28 A. BRADNEY, RELIGIONS, RIGHTS AND LAWS 67 (1993). 
29 ld. at 68. 
30 See MCEWAN, supra note 23, at 20. 
31 BRADNEY, supra note 28, at 69,70. 
8 
The British government purposely wove Christianity into education law. Since the 
enactment of the 1944 Act, people have slowly drifted away from religion. When the British 
government enacted the 1988 Act, Parliament consciously placed Christian education at the 
center of all religious education. 32 In fact, the 1988 Act was the first time Parliament explicitly 
mentioned "Christianity" in a provision of education legislation?3 However, British law does not 
specifically limit religious schools to Christianity. Currently there are a small number of Jewish 
and Muslim schools as well.34 Although the educational trend in Great Britain is toward freedom 
of religion and individual independence, modem legislation, particularly the 1988 Act, 
indoctrinates children with Christian beliefs because such legislation teaches children that 
Christianity represents community values and maintains British identity. This is the opposite of 
the American goal, to prevent religious indoctrination in public schools. 35 
Therefore to reiterate, British education has legislatively and in practice endorsed 
Christianity as the core faith. Because religious exceptions or accommodations are necessary, 
United States courts have the ability to grant them to protect the individual's right to free 
exercise. Therefore, the principal absence of religion from American public schools, which 
results from the First Amendment's prohibition of establishment, is more likely to promote 
increased religious freedom than the British system. 36 
32 Id at. 65,69,70. 
33 !d. 
34 !d. at 67. 
35 !d. 
36 Kass, supra note 1, at 1521. 
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United States Background 
In adopting the Constitution, the founders of the United States insisted on adding 
provisions to safeguard certain individual rights even when they were unpopular with the 
majority.37 The First Amendment safeguards religious freedom through two companion clauses. 
The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall pass no law respecting the establishment 
of religion,"38 while the Free Exercise Clause balances this by adding, "nor prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof."39 As with most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, these protections were 
later held to apply to the individual states and their political subdivisions by virtue of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
Unlike Great Britain, which openly endorses and funds religious education for different 
religions, the Supreme Court of the United States has struggled over the years to interpret the 
First Amendment's requirement that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"40 This amendment was intended to promote 
religious freedom while also creating a religiously neutral government that neither preferred any 
religious sect nor supported religion over irreligion.41 The Supreme Court has determined that 
the Establishment Clause prohibits federal and state governments from setting up churches, 
forcing people to participate in religious practices, punishing people based on their religious 
37 JOSEPH STORY, II COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 601 
(Little Brown & Co. 1873). 
38 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
39 !d. 
40 !d. 
41 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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beliefs, using taxes to fund religious programs or institutions, and participating in religious 
organizations. 42 
The Establishment Clause prevents public schools from providing students with religious 
instruction. Both the state and federal governments fund and operate public schools, school 
programs and policies cannot represent religious establishment. The United States's approach to 
religion in schools further departs from Great Britain's approach because the Establishment 
Clause typically restricts states from providing any type of funding to church-related schools. 
Public school programs that allow students to receive religious instruction at their parents' option 
once a week during the regular school day are unconstitutional if the program is held on school 
property and takes time away from secular studies. 43 Such programs are not religiously neutral 
because they are initiated tax-supported public school systems and utilize tax-supported public 
property. (School systems funded and operated by use of government-initiated tax programs) 
However, a program that releases students early so that they may pursue religious instruction 
elsewhere is constitutional because such a policy makes no use of public resources and merely 
accommodates individuals' religious needs by rearranging their school schedules. 44 
Also the Supreme Court held statutes from Maryland and Pennsylvania unconstitutional 
because they required that students recite portions of the Bible at the beginning of each school 
day. 45 Although such statutes allowed students to withdraw from engaging in the exercise, the use 
and validation of any type of prayer in a public school system nevertheless violated the 
42 Everson v. Bd. ofEduc., 330 U.S. 1, 1516 (1947). 
43 McCollum v. Bd. ofEduc., 333 U.S. 207,210 (1948). 
44 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,31415 (1952). 
45 Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). 
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separation of church and state required by the Establishment Clause.46 Similarly in Engel v. 
Vitale, the Supreme Court struck down a New York statute that directed all public school 
students to recite daily a nondenominational prayer written by the State Board ofRegents.47 By 
prohibiting the school-sponsored recitation of prayers during the school day, the Establishment 
Clause furthers the constitutional objective of protecting religious freedom by barring the 
preference of one religious belief over another.48 
In an effort to further separate public school education from religion, in Lee v. Weisman, 
the United States Supreme Court has held that religious prayers are also prohibited at school 
sponsored events outside of the classroom. 49 The Court gave three reasons for holding the 
school's involvement violated the Establishment Clause. First, a school official decided that an 
opening invocation and closing benediction should be given; second the school chose a 
clergyman to lead the prayer; finally and, most importantly: the school directed the content of the 
prayer that would be recited at a mandatory school ceremony.50 This is another instance where, 
the Supreme Court was concerned that the state-sponsored ceremony violated students' right to 
free exercise by pressuring nonbelievers to participate in a religious activity contrary to their own 
beliefs. 51 
The Court ultimately decided on the external boundaries of the Establishment Clause 
when it upheld the Equal Access Act of 1984, a law which created an exception to the neutrality 
46 !d. at 224-25. 
47 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 424 (1962). 
48 !d. at 431-432. 
49 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 586-87 (1992). 
50 ld at. 587-589. 
51 ld at. 593. 
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requirement in public schools. 52 This Act prohibits federally funded, public secondary schools 
from discriminating against students who wish to conduct a political, philosophical, or religious 
meeting on school property during non-instructional hours. 53 Although faculty may not 
participate in such meetings, their attendance is required. 54 The Supreme Court of the United 
States held that the Equal Access Act did not violate the Establishment Clause because it was 
more consistent with an equal access policy than a state system of sponsored religion. 55 
Furthermore, since the Equal Access Act requires that meetings occur during non-instructional 
time and that faculty be present merely to supervise, the Court held that it did not create an 
. 1 f d 1. . 56 excessive entang ement o government an re tgton. 
Education in America 
The United States's approach to religion in schools further deviates from Great Britain's 
approach because the Establishment Clause usually forbids states from providing any type of 
funding to church-related schools. In Great Britain, by contrast, religiously affiliated schools 
receive government funding. However, case law has gradually evolved such that states currently 
are permitted to disburse funds to religious schools under certain circumstances. 57 
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a New Jersey local school board 
policy of reimbursing parents for using public transportation buses to send their children to 
52 The Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2000). 
53 !d.§ 4071(a), (b). 
54 !d. § 4071(c), (3). 
55 Board of Education of Westside Community School v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
56 !d. at. 253 
57 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
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school. 58 Pursuant to this policy, parents received funds irrespective of whether their children 
attended public or Catholic parochial schools. 59 While acknowledging the wall of separation 
between church and state, the Supreme Court upheld the policy because it applied to all people 
generally, regardless of their religious beliefs. Therefore it was, "neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and non-believers. "60 As Justice Rehnquist has summarized the 
reigning view, "laws that have the 'purpose' or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion" run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause. Federal and state laws must be "neutral with respect to 
religion," completely separating the political sphere from the religious.61 
The Supreme Court developed a three-pronged test to determine whether statutes 
granting funding for education in religiously affiliated schools violate the Establishment Clause. 
This case involved two state statutes, one providing salary supplements for teachers in nonpublic 
schools and one authorizing reimbursement of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructions 
materials. 
This criterion for constitutional assessment has come to be commonly referred to as the 
Lemon Test.62 First, to survive constitutional scrutiny; a statute must have a secular legislative 
purpose. Second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion, and finally it must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 63 
58 Everson 330 U.S. 1. 
59 Id at. 3. 
60 !d. 
61 Kevin F. Ryan, Separation of Church and State: The Knotty Problems of Constitutional 
Interpretation, VT. B.J. 6 (2002) 
62 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
63 ld. 
14 
The Court acknowledged that "some involvement and entanglement between church and state 
are inevitable," but stated that "lines must be drawn." It held both statutes unconstitutional 
because they promoted excessive entanglement. 64 The United States Supreme Court has 
continued to use this test erratically, at times revising and at others despising it, Justice Scalia 
compared the Lemon test to a "ghoul in a late-night horror movie."65 Nevertheless, the test 
remains the leading method to determine whether a government entity has violated the 
Establishment Clause.66 
Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Title 
I); to assist low-achieving children meet state performance requirements. This Act provides 
additional funding to local educational agencies (LEA's).67 Student eligibility does not depend 
on whether the .child goes to a private or a public school, but instead on the character of the 
benefits provided by the funding: to qualify, the benefits must be secular, neutral, and non-
ideological. 
Establishment Clause issues were raised due to use of this particular aid. A group of 
parents, along with the Board of Education of the City ofNew York, sought relief from an 
injunction preventing Title I teachers from providing aid to students in religious private 
schools. 68 After concluding that Title I teachers could work in religious private schools because 
64 Id. at 624-25. 
65 Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
66 Amy J. Alexander, When Life Gives You the Lemon Test: An Overview of the Lemon Test arid 
Its Application, 3 PHOENIX L. REV. 641, 642 (2010). 
67 20 U.S.C. § 6312(a)-(b) (2000). 
68 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
15 
their presence neither promoted nor inhibited religion, the Supreme Court also held that the 
excessive entanglement analysis and the impermissible effect analysis were essentially the 
same.
69 
American Voucher System 
Claims regarding violations of the Establishment Clause based on the distribution of aid 
often occur in impoverished areas where a large number of students attend religiously affiliated 
private schools which offer a better education than local public schools. 70 To enjoy fully the 
freedoms guaranteed by the United States Constitution, children from these underprivileged 
areas need the best education possible.71 Without education, children would never be able to 
effectively participate in a democratic society such as the United States of America. 
Voucher programs are formed when the state allows individual students and their parents 
to determine which school the student will attend. The program allocates a specific sum of 
money that can be used for part or full payment for the student to attend that school. This system 
is the mirror attempt of the LEA structure of educational funding in England and Wales, with the 
dual goals of maintaining the current governments' position on its status of establishment, while 
promoting individual freedom of choice regarding education. A voucher program in the United 
States however, may provide that the voucher will go directly to the student or parent who then 
designates the ultimate recipient or that payment is to be given directly to the school. Voucher 
69 !d. at. 232. 
70 Zelman at. 681-682; (Thomas, J., concurring). 
71 !d. 
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programs may be designed to include secular private schools or all private schools, including 
sectarian ones, that otherwise meet certain academic or other qualifications. Some voucher 
programs may be structured such that they restrict participation in the program to public schools. 
Challenges to the voucher system have occurred when the program allowed public school 
students to attend any school. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court upheld an Ohio 
voucher program that provided parents with monetary grants to send their children to any school, 
public or private, even religious within the Cleveland City School District. 72 Because the 
program was one of true private choice, the Supreme Court held that it was entirely neutral 
toward religion. 73 
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court held that the program did not 
violate the Establishment Clause because the state money that ultimately flowed to participating 
private sectarian schools was the result of the parent's true private choice of which school their 
child would attend and, therefore, would receive the voucher money for tuition. 74 Justice 
O'Connor, who joined the Court's opinion, also wrote a separate concurrence emphasizing "that 
parents of voucher students in religious schools have exercised 'true private choice."'75 Justice 
Thomas, joined the Court's opinion also wrote a separate concurrence. He concentrated on the 
importance of providing disadvantaged residents of school districts and minorities an alternative 
to inadequate public schools. He also argued that religious liberty under the Fourteenth 
Amendment may have a different meaning than under the First Amendment, thus dictating a 
72 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 645-46, 653. 
73 !d. at. 653. 
74 !d. at. 639. 
75 !d. at. 663. 
17 
different scope of separation between religion and government than that required by the First 
Amendment's Establishment Clause. "These programs address the root of the problem with 
failing urban public schools that disproportionately affect minority students."76 The Supreme 
Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris virtually foreclosed the possibility that opponents 
of school voucher programs could raise a successful facial challenge based on federal 
constitutional grounds to a state voucher program. 77 
The Zelman case also did not address any state constitutional or statutory questions 
involving school vouchers. The Zelman case itself originally involved a challenge under the Ohio 
state constitution. The next, most viable challenge available to voucher opponents appears to be 
reliance upon state constitutional amendments that, more explicitly than the Establishment 
Clause, prohibit states from funding private, religious educational institutions. 78 The Ohio 
Supreme Court held that the Ohio voucher program, known as the Pilot Project Scholarship 
Program, violated C;l state constitutional single-subject provision but indicating in dicta that the 
program did not violate the Establishment Clause. 79 Several other courts have examined state 
constitutional challenges to voucher programs. State constitutions have provisions that include 
federal counterparts and may likewise raise questions regarding the validity of voucher 
76 !d. at. 639, 683. 
77 Robert A. Dietzel, The Future of School Vouchers: A Reflection on Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
and an Examination of the Blaine Amendments As A Viable Challenge to Sectarian School Aid 
Programs, 2003 MICH. ST. DeLL. REV. 791, 845 (2003). 
78 !d. 
79 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1 (1999). 
18 
programs. Courts are not required to construe these state constitutional provisions in the same 
way that the United States Constitutional provisions are construed. 80 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that state constitutions 
cannot provide less protection than the United States Constitution. However, state constitutions 
may provide more protection than the United States Constitution. States may construe their own 
Establishment Clause in a manner that is different than that which has been given to the United 
States Establishment Clause. States are within their rights to hold that the state constitution 
requires increased separation between government and the religion than is required by the United 
States Establishment Clause. Therefore, state voucher programs may still violate state 
constitutional provisions even after the United States Supreme Court upheld that the Cleveland 
voucher program did not violate the United States Constitution. 
The Supreme Court recently examined the impact of such a state constitutional provision 
that took a stricter position on separating religion and the state than does the United States 
Establishment Clause.81 In Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court held that neither the United States 
Free Exercise Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause was violated when a state refused to award 
a state scholarship to a student who was pursuing a degree in devotional theology, even though it 
provided such scholarships for secular instruction.82 The Supreme Court, however, did expressly 
acknowledge that the United States Establishment Clause would have permitted the state to 
provide students with devotional theological scholarships to those who are in that field of study. 
80 !d. 
81 Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313, 185 Ed. Law Rep. 30 (U.S. 2004). 
82 !d. 
19 
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The Locke case involved a constitutional challenge to a Washington state statute and the 
implementing policy of the state's Higher Education coordinating Board (HECB) prohibiting 
state aid to any post-secondary student who pursues a degree in theology. The provision in the 
state constitution at the heart of the issue provided that " [ n ]o public money or property shall be 
appropriated for or applied to any religion worship, exercise or instruction or the support of any 
religious establishment."83 The persistence of American Establishment Clause concerns is 
indicated by Locke v. Davey. 84 Several state constitutions consistently remain overly concerned 
with avoiding establishment instead of protecting freedom of individuals, conscience, or the 
human right of parental choice in schooling. 85 However, vouchers permit parents to take one step 
on the road to achieving the potential of the Free Exercise Clause by financing parental choice of 
a school for poor families without violating the Establishment Clause. 86 It therefore would 
appear that Locke tends to lend continuing support to the kind of voucher program at issue in 
Ohio. 
State constitutions may also have specific provisions, in addition, to the general state 
constitutional provisions that have federal counterparts, which expressly prohibit the expenditure 
of public funds at private religious schools or sectarian institutions for religious institutions. 
Some but not all of these provisions are known as Blaine Amendments. They inherited their 
name after an unsuccessful attempt to amend the United States Constitution in the nineteenth 
century by a proposal that was introduced into the House of Representatives by the 
83 Wash. Rev. Code§ 28B.10.814. 
84 C.M.A. Me Cauliff, Distant Mirror or Preview of Our Future: Does Locke v. Davey Prevent 
American Use of Creative English Financing for Religious Schools?, 29 VT. L. REV. 365,404 
(2005). 
85 !d. at. 404-405. 
86 !d. at. 404. 
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Representative from Maine, James G. Blaine.87 The amendments originate from anti-Catholic 
animus, as the Catholic minority increasingly sought public support for Catholic learning 
institutions. The constitutionality of these provisions which were, motivated by discriminatory 
temperament remains an open question. 
In Bush v. Holmes a Florida state appellate court stated in a footnote that, "there is no 
evidence of religious bigotry relating to Florida's no-aid provision" and its retention in the 1968 
general revision of the Florida Constitution. 88 The court further mentioned that the issue 
pertaining to bigotry was highly debated by legal scholars and historians. The state appellate 
court then held that the inclusion of sectarian schools in the state's voucher system violated the 
state constitution's no-aid provision that prohibited the expenditure of any public funds either 
indirectly or directly to aid sectarian institutions. 89 The court also held the no-aid provision did 
not violate the state Free Exercise Clause nor did it violate the federal Free Exercise Clause, 
citing the Supreme Court's decision in Locke v. Davey. The court noted that most Florida courts 
have interpreted the state Free Exercise Clause like the federal provision and that the state no-aid 
provision must be read in conjunction with the state Free Exercise Clause and Establishment 
Clause as all three are found in the same constitutional provision and therefore, "must be read in 
pari materia' to form [a] congruous whole so as not to render any language superfluous. "'90 
The Supreme Court has made some reference to the Blaine amendment and state 
counterparts issue. Justice Thomas, in writing the plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms, noted 
87 Toby J. Heytens, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REv. 117, 131-153 (2000). 
88 Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 351 n.9 (2004). 
89 Jd. at. 344. 
90ld at. 365. 
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the anti-Catholic prejudice surrounding the consideration of the federal Blaine Amendment and 
that the prohibition against aid to pervasively sectarian schools was in essence a reference to 
Catholic schools.91 He stated that "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of 
pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid programs, and other doctrines of 
this Court bar it. This doctrine, born of bigotry, should be buried now."92 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
avoided making a decision on the constitutionality of state amendments linked to the Blaine 
amendment in Locke v.Davey as the state amendment before the Supreme Court in Locke was not 
such an amendment. 93 
State Blaine Amendments or other amendments or statutes placing limits on the 
expenditure of state funds at sectarian institutions or for sectarian instruction or purpose may be 
construed as being essentially co-extensive with the prohibition of the United States's 
Establishment Clause. 94 In light of Zelman, this result would mean that such state constitutional 
provisions would not prevent the inclusion of sectarian schools in a voucher program. However, 
Locke certainly indicates that states may be free to construe their own law to restrict the 
participation of sectarian schools in voucher programs. 
General Applicability in the United States 
Laws that apply to the general population, at times, conflict with an individual's religious 
beliefs, encroaching on his or her right to free exercise, and courts are consequently required to 
91 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-829 (2000). 
92 !d. 
93 Locke, 540 U.S. 712, 723 n.7 (2004). 
94 Heytens, supra note 87, at 160. 
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resolve the dispute, either ruling in favor of the individuals fundamental rights or affirming on 
the basis of need to maintain an orderly society. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Supreme Court of the 
United States upheld the First Amendment rights of Amish children whose religious views were 
in conflict with a state statute requiring them to attend private or public school until the age of 
sixteen. 95 The parents of several children were convicted of violating the statute when they 
refused to send their children to school after the children completed the eighth grade.96 The 
parents argued that the statute infringed upon their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
because sending their children to high school directly conflicted with the Amish religion and 
lifestyle.97 
The Supreme Court agreed that Wisconsin had an indisputable interest in educating 
children but said that the state's interest in education was not automatically superior to other 
interests because "only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can 
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion."98 The Supreme Court held that 
Wisconsin could not compel school attendance against a claim of religious interference unless 
the requirement on its face did not impede the free exercise of religion or the state's interest was 
compelling enough to exceed protection of the individual's First Amendment right.99 
When balancing the significance of the varying interests, the Supreme Court considered 
the genuineness of the parents' claims and emphasized the difference between mere personal 
95 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,207 (1972). 
96 Id. 
97 I d. at. 208, 209. 
98 ld. at. 214, 215. 
99 ld. at. 214. 
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preference and sincere religious belief, resolving that the parents' claims in Yoder were, in fact, 
religiously based. 100 The Supreme Court found that the Wisconsin statute severely hindered the 
Amish children's free exercise of religion because their religion has existed for centuries and is 
modeled upon a simple lifestyle that disregards current societal norms, along with advances in 
technology, and instead focuses on devotion to family, community and God. 101 Forcing Amish 
children to attend public high school would compromise their religious beliefs by exposing them 
to values contrary to their own and to excessive pressure from their peers to conform. 102 
In its arguments the state took the position it had a strong interest in producing self-
sufficient individuals capable of intelligently partaking in society, however the Supreme Court 
did not agree that this interest was compelling enough to impose upon the Amish beliefs. 103 The 
Supreme Court also noted that particular religiously driven behavior could be subject to 
regulations of general applicability intended "to promote the health, safety, and general welfare" 
of the public."104 The Supreme Court further explained that the right of the parents to direct the 
upbringing of their children, in conjunction with their First Amendment right to exercise religion 
freely, outweighed the state's compelling interest because the Amish parents did not jeopardize 
the health or well-being of their children. 105 The Supreme Court distinguished its rule regarding 
laws of general applicability from the balancing test established in Yoder. 106 
100 Id at. 215, 216. 
101 Id at. 21 0. 
102 !d. at. 217,218. 
103 !d. at. 221. 
104 !d. at. 220. 
105 !d. at. 223, 224. 
106 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1992). 
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In Employment Division v. Smith, two individuals were dismissed from their job positions 
when it was learned they ingested peyote during a Native American religious ceremony. 107 The 
use of the peyote violated an Oregon law which prohibited the possession of certain controlled 
substances. The Supreme Court considered whether the prohibition of the religious use of peyote 
violated the Free Exercise Clause. 108 
States must be permitted to regulate in order to maintain a democratic society and citizens 
must obey certain laws. 109 The Supreme C<?urt refused to exempt the individuals from the 
Oregon law because it was a neutral, generally applicable law not intended to promote or oppress 
any religious beliefs. 110 The Court explained that the holding in Yoder, which allows the Court to 
use a compelling interest test, applied only because that case involved a combination or a 
"hybrid" of constitutional rights, the right to direct the upbringing of one's children and the right 
to free exercise. 111 This conclusion supports the idea that two claims involving infringements of 
constitutional rights, which would fail if alleged separately, have the potential to succeed when 
they are asserted as a combination because the hybrid of constitutional rights triggers the 
11. . 112 compe tng Interest test. 
107 !d. at. 874. 
108 !d. at. 876. 
109 !d. at. 879. 
110 !d. 
111 !d. at. 881. 
112 William L. Esser, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus or 
Constitutional Smokescreen?, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 211,218-19 (1998). But see Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
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Recent Cases in the United States and Great Britain 
In a United States case the great-grandmother of a student sued the local school district, 
claiming that the district's mandatory uniform policy was unconstitutional, subsequently she 
argued the policy did not have any provisions allowing students to "opt-out" for religious 
causes. 
113 The complaint was brought forward after the student was suspended from school for 
noncompliance with the policy. The great-grandmother's position was that the policy infringed 
upon her right as her great-grandson's legal guardian to direct his upbringing and free 
exercise. 114 The grandmother's specific belief was that forcing students to wear uniforms 
eliminates an individual's free will and is "characteristic of the 'last days' and required by the 
anti-Christ."115 In this circumstance her religious faith required her to oppose the anti-Christ and 
prevent her children from becoming indoctrinated with his mark and his orders. 116 
The District Court explained that the plaintiff was entitled to strict scrutiny of the uniform 
policy because the circumstances of this case could fall under the hybrid-rights exemption 
demonstrated by Yoder. 117 The District Court did not resolve the issue on the merits but only 
denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment.l18 The court's rationale focused on the 
previous established right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children and that the 
113 Hicks v. Halifax County Board of Education, 93 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D.N.C. 1999). 
114 Id. at. 657. 
115 ld. at. 653. 
116/d. at. 653, 654. 
117 ld. at. 663. 
118 Jd. 
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Supreme Court of the United States has protected religious beliefs under the First Amendment 
even when such beliefs are not "acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others."119 
Applying the balancing test from Yoder, a court would have to compare the government 
interest with the sincerity of the religious beliefs involved. There is no history after Hicks but a 
likely prediction is that it would lose on its merits. A court could easily conclude that the Board 
of Education's compelling interest in creating a uniform policy outweighed the, imposition to the 
grandmother's rights, while acknowledging burden imposed. The Board of Education 
specifically stated that the policy had the following benefits: "1) improved student behavior, 2) 
increased safety in schools, 3) increased sense of belonging and school pride among students, 4) 
increased emphasis on individual personality and achievement rather than outward appearance 
among students, and, 5) elimination of negative distinctions between wealthy and needy 
children." 120 
Additionally the School Board spoke to local parents in the community with varying 
religious associations all of whom stated that a uniform policy would not violate their religious 
beliefs. The Board knew that the plaintiff was opposed to the policy, but the Board could not 
understand how its policy offended the plaintiffs religion. 121 This is an indicating factor, that the 
burden to the plaintiffs religious beliefs may not have been substantial enough to permit a 
religious exemption. 
The Eastern District of New York considered the validity of a school policy requiring 
certain immunizations unless the students were "bona fide members of a recognized religious 
119 !d. at. 657, 658. 
120 !d. at. 652. 
121 !d. at. 653. 
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organization."122 Two families were denied an exemption because they did not belong to a 
recognized religious organization, after they objected to the immunization of their children for 
religious reasons. 123 In recognizing the compelling government interest in mandatory 
inoculations the District Court held that by limiting the exemption to members of a recognized 
religion the provision was unconstitutional. This is because it preferred some religions over 
others and prevented individuals from the free exercise of religion, violating the Establishment 
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. 124 The District Court then concluded that both plaintiffs 
offered religious reasons for requesting an exemption.169 The court held that one plaintiff was 
entitled to an exemption from the vaccination rule because that individuals religious beliefs were 
sincere, under the court's determination the other plaintiff did not hold such a belief and 
therefore should not benefit from and exemption. 125 
It should be noted that in Hicks and Sherr the individuals involved held religious beliefs 
that represent a small minority of the American population. Laws are obviously less likely to 
conflict with the religious beliefs of individuals who are represented by a majority. If a majority 
of American people were required to refuse immunization for religious reasons, such a practice 
would likely be the societal norm and students would not need an exception to the rule. The 
circumstances are similar in Great Britain, however, exemptions will not be granted in Great 
Britain unless there is no viable alternative. 
122 Sherr v. Northport-East Northport Union Free School District, 672 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
123 !d. at. 88. 
124 ld. at 89, 91. 
125 !d. at. 96, 97. 
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In Great Britain there has been a case concerning a schoolgirl who was successfully 
excluded from school because of her choice to wear a severe Muslim dress. 126 Unlike well 
reported and comparable cases of other countries in Europe, the basis of the exclusion was not a 
rule prohibiting Muslim dress in school in order to maintain a secular or Christian philosophy. 
Like most British schools they imposed a uniform requirement on students. The school uniform 
was designed with the large Muslim population in the area taken into consideration. In the design 
phase of the uniform the school consulted with a local mosque to guarantee that variations were 
available which suited Islamic dress code, thereby encouraging a multicultural attitude within the 
school. 
The issue was that the particular form of Islamic dress Gilbab) which the pupil wished to 
use was more severe than the one considered normal by the local Muslim leadership, and 
therefore did not conform to the uniform. 127 The question before the court was not whether or not 
Islamic dress could be visible within the school, but instead whether the individual convictions 
of the individual should be allowed to prevail over a solution which had been reached 
collectively. 128 The judgment of the Court of Appeal was that the individual should prevail, 
reasoning that religious freedom is a matter of individual conscience rather than membership of a 
particular community involving compliance with its norms. This represents perhaps the first 
acknowledgment by the British Courts that religious freedom involves the individual conscience, 
rather than participation in a particular collectivity. However, the co-existence of an established 
church and this principle is questionable. 
126 D. R v. Head Teacher & Governors ofDenbigh High School, (2006) UKHL 15, (2006) All 
ER487. 
127 !d.~~ 31-47. 
128 !d.~ 49 
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Such a determination depends on the circumstances of the case. Not all religiously 
motivated acts will be protected by Article 9. In an employment setting, the European Court of 
Human Rights will not find an interference with one's right to manifest religious beliefs when a 
person voluntarily accepts employment that does not accommodate a specific religious practice 
and there are alternative options that do not present undue hardship or inconvenience. 129 The 
student in Denbigh chose a school that was outside of her district, she also knew about the 
uniform policy before she started attending, and there were three other schools in the area which 
permitted the wearing of the jilbab. It could be argued that there was no interference with the 
student's right to manifest religious beliefs. Lord Bingham concluded that there was no 
interference with the right to manifest religious beliefs, to be justified; interference must be 
prescribed by law and necessary for a specific democratic purpose. 130 A school uniform policy is 
not necessarily law but it is prescribed by the school for a specific purpose, therefore, the school 
was justified in its actions and did not need to change its uniform policy. 131 
Also in Great Britain nine students brought claims against their local education authority 
because the LEA would not provide the students with transportation to the school of their 
choice. 132 The claims were brought under the Ra~e Relations Act of 197 6 and the European 
Convention for Human Rights of 1950.133 The parent ofthe students wanted them to receive 
Jewish education. All were members of a Jewish community in Leeds, but were attending 
schools in Manchester. A provision in the free transportation policy stated that students are 
129 Id. ~ 23. 
130 Id. ~ 34. 
131 !d. 
132 E. R v. Leeds City Council Education, [2005] EWHC 2495, (Admin.). 
133 Jd. ~ 3. 
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eligible for free transportation if the school is outside of the Leeds area, a diocese designates the 
nearest appropriate school, and the school is more than three miles away from the student's 
home. 134 The Jewish student wished to attend a school located 45 miles away, when all of the 
other students who chose schools outside of Leeds travel between 3.4 and 5.9 miles. 
The parties argued that under the Education Act 1996, the local education authority was 
required to provide such transportation. The Queen's Bench Division considered the following 
factors: the suitability of the chosen school, the suitability of an alternate school, the underlying 
reasons for the parental preference, various financial considerations, and other policy 
considerations enacted by the LEA. 135 Furthermore, when an LEA's decides not to provide free 
transportation to a student will not be reversed unless it is irrational. The Queen's Bench 
Division refused to provide free transportation to the students due to the existence of a high 
school in Leeds which offered some Hebrew studies and the cost associated with providing the 
students with free transportation to Manchester. 136 
The parents also set forth several claims under different provisions of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. A violation of the right to practice one's religion asserted under 
Article 9 of the Convention was the most relevant claim.137 The court also rejected this argument 
stating that "Article 9 does not protect every act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief and 
does not in all cases guarantee the right to behave in the public sphere in a way which is dictated 
134 Id., 9. 
135 /d., 18. 
136 Jd., 19. 
137 ld., 37. 
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by a belief."138 Further, the court held that there must more than a mere inconvenience on the 
manifestation of one's religious beliefs, therefore it must be found to be a material infringement 
on religious rights. 139 This decision plainly opposes the more sensitive manner American courts 
use when analyzing Free Exercise cases. 
Conclusion 
One should notice that the plaintiffs in this case asserted several claims under both the 
European Convention for Human Rights and the Education Act. However, in the judge's opinion 
neither one of these enactments appeared to hold more weight than the other. This is particularly 
different from the United States, where plaintiffs usually assert that one piece of legislation 
violates the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. The lynchpin to the difference between 
the two countries is in Great Britain judges can simply refuse to accommodate individuals based 
on prior precedent. Although Great Britain wants to guarantee all of its citizens certain freedoms, 
fewer exemptions seem to be granted in Great Britain because the plaintiffs have a harder time 
defining the right and demonstrating that there was a material violation. 
138 !d., 39. 
139 !d., 40. 
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